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BY
MARC POMP∗ AND VICTORIA SHESTALOVA∗
Summary
We use data from a consumer survey to uncover factors deterring consumer switching in liber-
alised residential energy markets in The Netherlands. We find that actual or perceived switching
costs represent an important barrier for switching energy suppliers. This enables incumbent firms
to charge higher markups than entrants. We analyse the welfare consequences of switching costs
in two scenarios, a pessimistic one in which switching costs remain at the level measured in the
survey and an optimistic one in which they decline enough for the market to reach a competitive
equilibrium level. The paper concludes with a discussion of policy options for reducing switching
costs.
Key words: consumer choice, energy, switching cost, competition policy
1 INTRODUCTION
The theory of industrial organisation has long focused on the behaviour of
firms in explaining high markups. However, it is increasingly recognised that
consumer behaviour may also be important. In a pioneering paper, Waterson
(2003) provides numerous examples in which a lack of consumer response to
market signals results in insufficient competition. The presence of search and
switching costs is one important reason why consumers do not always switch
in response to a substantial difference in price. Search and switching costs
may consist of monetary costs (e.g. switching fees), but may also include costs
in terms of time, dislike of paper-work, stress, etc. (see e.g. Klemperer 1995).
Measuring these factors and estimating their consequences for market out-
comes is hard, but also of crucial importance for policy design, especially in
newly liberalised markets such as markets for energy where consumers previ-
ously had no choice of supplier. In this paper, we attempt to shed light on the
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importance of switching costs for the success or failure of the liberalisation
of the residential segment of the Dutch retail energy market. This liberalisa-
tion took effect on July 1, 2004, and completed the move to liberalised retail
energy markets that began in 2000.
We provide new empirical evidence on search and switching costs of Dutch
consumers in energy markets, based on data from a consumer survey of
the Dutch Consumer Union (Consumentenbond). The study is intended to
inform policy makers and regulators about the role of search and switch-
ing costs in determining the effects of liberalisation in terms of market out-
comes and ultimately welfare. We argue that it is important to reduce real and
perceived switching costs. We discuss policy options aimed at that, such as
introduction of standard contracts and improvement of consumer information
about actual switching costs.
The paper proceeds as follows. We describe Dutch residential energy mar-
kets in section 2. Next, we present empirical evidence from a consumer survey
(section 3), after which we turn to welfare implications of switching costs (sec-
tion 4). Section 5 discusses policy options to reduce switching costs. Section 6
concludes.
2 MARKET STRUCTURE AND ENTRY
The liberalisation of Dutch energy markets began with the liberalisation of
the large user segment in 1999. As a next step, the middle user segment was
opened up to competition in 2002. Finally, the small user segment followed in
2004. As a parallel development, green electricity1 markets were fully libera-
lised on July 1, 2001, creating possibilities for entry in the middle and small
user segments of the energy markets. Before the completion of liberalisation
in 2004, 48% of households had switched to green electricity, and one quarter
of them had switched to another supplier.2 On July 1, 2004, the market was
fully liberalised and all consumers were allowed to choose their supplier(s) of
green or grey electricity3 and gas.
Prior to liberalisation there were about 20 regional energy companies, some
of which merged between 2000 and 2004. These regional companies were
vertically integrated public monopolies. In the course of restructuring, net-
work firms were separated from production and retail supply firms.4 These
1 Green energy is defined as energy generated from renewable resources through licensable and
environmentally and socially responsible production processes.
2 According to the Consumentenbond (2004). Their estimate of the number of green electricity
consumers is close to the reports of the branch organisation of energy companies.
3 Electricity that is not classified as ‘green’, is called ‘grey’.
4 Traditionally, energy suppliers belonged to vertically integrated regional energy holdings
owned by provincial governments or municipal councils. In the course of the industry restruc-
turing, the firms were separated functionally and legally. The Dutch Minister of Economic
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competitive parts are now fully liberalised and can compete internationally5,
while the networks remain regulated by the Dutch energy regulator, DTe.
Supply firms represent the commercial link of the energy industry with
the customer: they sell energy, take care of metering and collect payments.
In addition to traditional suppliers, there are new firms in the Dutch energy
markets.
Table 1 (second column) shows the initial market shares of the incum-
bent electricity suppliers in the residential segment, based on historic data.
The three largest suppliers served more than 90% of households, while sev-
eral small companies supplied the rest.
Post-liberalisation data on market shares is not publicly available, but it is
known from the press and from published reports that incumbents were los-
ing market share to entrants. Less than a year after liberalisation, the com-
bined market share of the two largest entrants in the residential electricity
market, Oxxio and Greenchoice, already amounted to 8%.6 According to DTe
(2006), there are currently 23 electricity suppliers and 19 gas suppliers in this
segment of the energy market; the market share of the three largest compa-
nies is 82% in electricity and in 79% in gas.
The last column of Table 1 shows market shares of the electricity com-
panies in our dataset. This dataset was collected by the Dutch Consumer
Union in September 2004. It represents the situation among members of the
Consumer Union. Of all respondents, 82% were served by the three larg-
est incumbents, the same percentage as in DTe (2006), and 9.3% by new
entrants. Relatively many respondents who switched to new entrants have
chosen Oxxio or Greenchoice.
Note that most Dutch consumers were well aware that they could change
supplier as of July 2004. First, green electricity markets had been fully liber-
alised for 3 years, so the liberalisation idea was not completely new for them.
Also, the final step towards full liberalisation was preceded by a massive pub-
licity campaign by both the Ministry of Economic Affairs and incumbent
Footnote 4 continued
Affairs intends to implement their ownership separation. See Mulder and Shestalova (2006)
for more detail on ownership separation issues.
5 The Netherlands is a net importer of electricity (net import is about 16% of consumption)
and a net exporter of gas (net export is about one third of production). Suppliers buy energy
from producers and sell it to consumers of electricity. Producers can also be suppliers. Most
electricity produced and consumed in The Netherlands is thermal. The share of green elec-
tricity has been increasing over the last few years. In 2005, the share of green electricity in
import was 8.6% and the share of domestically produced green electricity in the total electric-
ity consumption was 6.1%. Sources: TenneT (2006), CBS (2005), Energiened (2002).
6 In 2005, Oxxio had 0.5 mln connections and Greenchoice had above 0.1 mln connections.
Source: Energiea, April 6, 2005, www.energiea.nl
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TABLE 1 – MARKET SHARES IN THE ELECTRICITY MARKET FOR SMALL
RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMERS
Market share before liber-
alisation (based on historic




in the Consumer Union
survey of September 2004
% %
Nuon companies 38.5 31.1
Eneco companies 24.6 21.8a
Essent companies 33.1 29.5

















Notes: Market shares are derived as the ratio of small customers of each company to the total
number of small customers in The Netherlands (column 2) and in the survey (column 3).
a Eneco and Shell Nederland.
b ONS and Echte Energie.
c Energiebedrijf.com, Durion and Evolta, now under the name Oxxio.
Source: Own computations based on data on distribution companies from DTe decisions on
X-factors and from the consumer survey of the Dutch Consumer Union.
companies.7 Given this, the consumer awareness regarding the possibility
to change energy supplier was very high in The Netherlands (for example,
almost 100% of consumers involved in this consumer survey were aware
about this possibility). Many Dutch consumers arrange switching on the web.
Access to internet in The Netherlands is relatively high, for example, in 2004
(the year of the completion of liberalisation), nearly 60% of the Dutch pop-
7 In addition to advertising, some companies offered presents and discounts to new customers
to increase their willingness to switch.
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ulation had access to the Internet at home.8 This is quite different from the
situation prevailing on the eve of liberalisation in the UK, where both aware-
ness was not very high (partly because of regional differences in liberalization
dates, see Giulietti et al. 2005) and the level of the internet access was much
lower.
3 EVIDENCE ON SWITCHING COSTS
In this section we use data from a consumer survey conducted by the Dutch
Consumer Union to gain insights in perceived search and switching costs in
energy markets. The survey was conducted 3months after liberalisation, in
September 2004. A total of 1,123 members of the consumer panel of the Con-
sumer Union took part in the survey (out of 1,800 panel members to whom
it was sent, i.e., a response rate of 62%). The survey included questions about
consumer behaviour in energy markets, attitude towards liberalisation, views
about the role of institutions, etc. Most questions in the survey were multiple-
choice questions. For example, respondents had to indicate to what degree
they agreed or disagreed with a certain statement. In addition, there were
‘factual’ questions, concerning switching behaviour, the type of contract, the
amount of the electricity bill, etc. It was possible to link this information to
characteristics of respondents, such as age, education, income category and
home ownership.
Before we present relevant outcomes from the survey, a remark should be
made regarding the representativeness of our sample. The composition of the
respondents in our dataset is not fully representative for the Dutch popula-
tion. The members of the consumer panel are on average somewhat older, and
have a higher level of income and education than the average in The Neth-
erlands.9 Especially large is the discrepancy in home ownership: 80% of our
sample are home-owners, while according to the latest data of the Central
Bureau of Statistics, the percentage for The Netherlands as a whole is 52%.
Therefore, in the welfare analysis of the effects of switching costs in the next
section we use post-stratified estimates correcting for this difference.10
As a background to the analysis that follows, Table 2 shows general atti-
tudes of consumers towards liberalisation. Clearly, liberalisation was not met
with enormous enthusiasm by these consumers: only slightly over one quarter
more or less agreed with the thesis that liberalisation will favour consumers.
In this market, consumer search and switching costs relate to time and
effort spent on searching and switching. Monetary switching costs may arise
8 Source: CBS (2005) About 30% of adults do not use the Internet, Web magazine, 14 June
2005, www.cbs.nl.
9 Consumentenbond (2004).
10 See e.g. Rice (1995).
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TABLE 2 – ANSWERS TO THE QUESTION: DO YOU AGREE THAT LIBERALISATION
OF ENERGY MARKET WORKS IN FAVOUR OF CONSUMERS?
Percentage (St. error)
Absolutely agree 2.9 (0.5)
Agree to some extent 23.2 (1.3)
Neither agree nor disagree 29.2 (1.4)
Disagree to some extent 19.2 (1.2)
Absolutely disagree 16.3 (1.1)
No opinion/not applicable 9.1 (0.9)
Total number of observations 1,097
TABLE 3 – ANSWERS TO THE QUESTION: HOW MUCH TIME YOU THINK WOULD
BE NEEDED TO FIND A NEW SUPPLIER AND TO SIGN UP THERE?
Switchers Non-switchers Total
Not more than 1 hour 17.3 (3.1) 7.5 (0.9) 9.0 (0.9)
Some hours 30.7 (3.8) 18.5 (1.3) 20.4 (1.2)
A morning or an afternoon 15.3 (3.0) 22.5 (1.4) 21.3 (1.2)
A day 14.7 (2.9) 18.8 (1.3) 17.9 (1.2)
Another answer, namely. . . 6.0 (1.9) 4.0 (0.7) 4.3 (0.6)
Indicated that the time needed ranges
from ‘days’ to ‘weeks’
2.7 (1.3) 2.8 (0.5) 2.7 (0.5)
Don’t know (more) 13.3 (2.8) 26.0 (01.5) 24.4 (1.3)
Total number of observations 150 904 1,099
This table gives the respective percentages and their standard errors.
Not all respondents indicated whether they had switched supplier or not. Therefore, the number
of switchers and non-switchers do not sum up to the total.
only in case of premature termination of a contract with a fixed duration (see
section 5). Table 3 provides an overview of responses to a question about the
expected time needed for searching and switching. Most respondents (69%)
expect to spend one day or less. When we split the observations into two
groups consisting of those who switched provider (‘switchers’) and those who
did not (‘non-switchers’), we see that on average switchers have substan-
tially lower estimates of the time needed than non-switchers. Here we define
‘switching’ as changing supplier for one or more energy products (green elec-
tricity, grey electricity or gas), which means that our definition includes also
switches of green energy supplier made before July 2004. Note that the num-
ber observations in each subgroup is smaller than in the total sample, espe-
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cially in the subgroup of switchers, which is why the standard errors become
larger.
There are two interpretations for this difference. Either the differences are
real, and non-switchers indeed need more time to switch, or ex ante expecta-
tions of switchers and non-switchers were the same but switchers found out, by
the very act of switching, that the time requirement was much less than they
had expected. In the latter case, causality runs from switching to the expected
time needed for switching. Put differently, expected time needed for switching is
endogenous. If endogeneity does not play an important role, we would expect
that expected switching costs are higher for low-educated and older people,
for whom the time-costs of obtaining and processing information are plausibly
higher. Hence, there will be relatively fewer switchers among them than in the
total sample. However, this is not what we find in our data: the percentage of
switchers in the complete sample (14.4%, st. error 1.1%) is roughly the same
as in the ‘65+’-group (15.6%, st. error 2.7%), and in the group with education
not higher than intermediate vocational (MBO; 14.5%, st. error 1.7%).
We therefore conclude tentatively that expected time needed for switching
is likely to be endogenous, i.e. that the difference between switchers and
non-switchers reflects a difference between ex ante expectation of perceived
switching costs and actual switching costs.
Respondents were also asked what minimum amount of bill savings per
year would induce them to switch supplier (see Table 4). Required bill savings
are lower for switchers than for non-switchers: on average, about 60% of
respondents would switch for bill savings less than 150 euros, however, among
switchers the figure of 60% is reached already at bill savings of 100 euros. This
implies that switchers are more responsive to price than non-switchers. They
are more likely to use the opportunity to reduce their energy bill by switching
supplier.
4 CONSEQUENCES OF SWITCHING COSTS FOR PRICES AND WELFARE
In this section, we study the consequences of switching costs for welfare
effects of liberalisation. Following Giulietti et al. (2005), we first calculate
the price differential between incumbent firms and new entrants given current
switching preferences (as measured in the survey). Next, we construct two sce-
narios for the welfare effects of liberalisation: a pessimistic one based on cur-
rent switching behaviour, and an optimistic one in which the willingness to
switch at a given price differential sharply increases.
4.1 Pricing by Incumbents
If switching costs are substantial, incumbent firms may follow a strategy
of ‘milking’ their existing customer base: charging prices well above those
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TABLE 4 – ANSWERS TO THE QUESTION: WHAT IS THE MINIMUM AMOUNT PER
YEAR THAT YOU WOULD LIKE TO SAVE ON YOUR ENERGY EXPENSES TO WANT
TO CHANGE SUPPLIER?
Switchers Non-switchers Total
Less than 25 euros 5.4 (1.9) 1.2 (0.4) 1.8 (0.4)
25–50 euros 25.1 (3.6) 8.9 (0.9) 11.1 (0.9)
50–75 euros 15.6 (3.0) 12.5 (1.1) 12.6 (1.0)
75–100 euros 14.3 (2.9) 15.5 (1.2) 15.4 (1.1)
100–150 euros 12.2 (2.7) 18.6 (1.3) 18.0 (1.2)
150–200 euros 2.0 (1.2) 5.0 (0.7) 4.6 (0.6)
200–250 euros 2.0 (1.2) 5.0 (0.7) 4.4 (0.6)
250–300 euros 0.7 (0.7) 2.3 (0.5) 2.2 (0.4)
More than 300 euros 2.0 (1.2) 3.3 (0.6) 3.2 (0.5)
Savings play no role in switching decision 6.1 (2.0) 4.5 (0.7) 4.6 (0.6)
Will never change, independently of the
amount to be saved
4.1 (1.6) 6.7 (0.8) 6.2 (0.7)
Do not know 10.2 (2.5) 16.4 (1.2) 15.8 (1.1)
Total number of observations 147 907 1,099
This table gives the respective percentages and their standard errors.
Not all respondents indicated whether they had switched supplier or not. Therefore, the number
of switchers and non-switchers do not sum up to the total.
charged by new entrants. In order to determine how much higher, we start
from the following equation for the variable profits of an incumbent firm:
Π= Q¯ · (PI −C) · N , (1)
where Q¯ is the quantity of energy consumed, assumed to be independent of
price, over the relevant price range; PI the price charged by an incumbent
firm; C the marginal cost and N is the number of customers of an incumbent
firm.
Consistent with what we find in our data, we will assume that switchers
have an annual energy consumption equal to the average in the sample.11
Given this assumption, equation (1) implies the following decomposition of
a change in profits:
Π= Q¯ · [NPI + (PI −C) ·N +PI N ] . (2)
11 In particular, the means of annual electricity and gas consumption of switchers are close to
those in the total sample. The respective numbers (with standard errors given in brackets) are:
3,813 (198) kWh and 3,789 (70) kWh of electricity; and 1,993 (114) m3 and 1,828 (35) m3 of
gas.
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Equation (2) can be rewritten as:
Π= Q¯ · (N +N ) ·PI + Q¯ · (PI −C) ·N . (3)
We will use this equation to analyse the effect of raising PI on profits, ceteris
paribus. Since PI is the choice variable of the firm, we interpret N as the
change in the number of customers as a consequence of raising price. Under
this interpretation, the first term in the RHS of equation (3) equals additional
profits on remaining customers as a result of an increase in PI , while the sec-
ond term on the RHS equals forgone profits on customers who have switched
to another firm as a result of an increase in PI .
We do not directly observe the marginal cost C . However, we will assume
that new entrants price at marginal cost, in which case we can use entrants’
prices as an estimate of marginal costs. This assumption is theoretically rea-
sonable: in competitive markets, equilibrium prices should be near marginal
cost. Although in practice new entrants may temporarily price below mar-
ginal cost to gain market share, we ignore this possibility, as such a strategy
cannot be feasible in the long run. Pricing above marginal costs is possible,
but our results still hold as long as the entrants’ price does not exceed mar-
ginal cost too much.12 With this assumption, equation (3) becomes:
Π= Q¯ · (N +N ) ·PI + Q¯ · (PI − PE ) ·N , (4)
where PE is the price of new entrants.
Equation (4) will be used to determine the profit maximising price of an
incumbent firm. As indicated in section 3, our data contain information on
the number of customers who would switch to another provider, N , for var-
ious amounts of bill savings, Q¯ ·PI . Plugging these combinations of Q¯ ·PI
and N into equation (4) allows us to calculate the effects on profits of suc-
cessive stepwise increases in price above the level of entrants.13
Table 5 below presents the results of this procedure. The table is based on a
representative firm that initially (at PI = PE ) has 1,000 customers. This num-
ber serves only as a normalisation and does not in any way affect our sub-
stantive results. The first row shows that, with a price differential between
12 If entrants price somewhat above marginal costs, the incumbent’s loss from additional
switchers is larger than in Table 5. However, as long as entrants’ markups are small, the
incumbent’s profit will be still maximised at a price differential of at least 75 euros. Only if
markups are substantial, the incumbent’s profit is maximised at a smaller price differential.
However, the incumbent’s price is still higher in the latter case.
13 In reality, the distribution of bill savings required in order to switch differs across incum-
bents. For example, one firm’s existing customer base may on average require high minimum
bill savings in order to switch, while another firm has a customer base with on average low
minimum bill savings required for switching. Since the differences across firms are small (see
Table A in Appendix), we choose to work with a representative firm.
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−N N +N Q¯ · (N +N ) ·
PI
Q¯ · (PI − PE ) ·
N
Π
25 18 982 24,550 0 24,550
50 135 847 21,175 3,375 17,800
75 161 686 17,150 8,050 9,100
100 174 512 12,800 13,050 −250
150 188 324 16,200 18,800 −2,600
200 59 265 13,250 8,850 4,400
250 56 210 10,500 11,200 −700








a Post-stratified estimates are used (rounded to integers). The total is normalised to 1000. Since
we have only discrete information on the distribution of the expected savings, we assume that
consumers do not leave as long as the price change remains within the range defined by the two
neighbouring values of expected savings. Additional switching occurs only when the price reaches
the end of the range.
b The answers ‘do not know’ are treated as missing values.
Source: Direct computation from survey data, based on the methodology from Giulietti et al.
(2005).
incumbents and new entrants of 25 euros on the annual energy bill, 18 of the
firm’s consumers would switch to a new entrant. Initially (before raising its
price) the firm did not make a profit on these consumers (this follows from
our assumption that new entrants charge at marginal cost). Therefore the loss
in market share does not lead to a fall in profits. However, profits on remain-
ing customers would increase by 25 euros per customer, or 24,550 euros in
total. The next row repeats this calculation for a price differential of 50 euros.
In this case, the additional profits from higher prices paid by remaining cus-
tomers must be compared to the fall in profit due to consumers who switch to
other providers. It turns out that at a price differential of 100 euros the loss
in profit due to the decline in the number of customers outweighs the gain in
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profits on remaining customers. We conclude that the profit maximising price
differential for an incumbent firm is somewhere between 75 and 100 euros.14
Interestingly, for the UK, Giulietti et al. (2005) obtain the threshold
amount of 8 pounds per month (150 euros per year) – twice the amount in
The Netherlands. Only 45% of the UK consumers would be willing to switch
at this amount.
4.2 Consumer Welfare After Liberalisation: Two Scenarios
Since the price elasticity of the demand of small consumers for energy is
small, price changes have little effect on demand. Therefore the effect of lib-
eralisation of this market segment on total welfare (the sum of consumer and
producer surplus) is small.15,16 The most important effect of liberalisation in
this market segment is a reallocation of surplus between firms and consumers.
We assess potential effects of switching costs on surplus reallocation
between firms and consumers under two scenarios, an optimistic one and a
pessimistic one. In the optimistic scenario, we assume that switching costs
fall in the years following liberalisation, so that the willingness to switch at
a given price differential increases. This reduces the price differential between
incumbents and entrants. In the pessimistic scenario, switching costs remain
at the current level and the willingness to switch does not change. In such a
case, it is profitable for incumbents to raise prices compared to the level just
before liberalisation. For both scenarios we estimate the change in consumer
welfare as a consequence of liberalisation. This change equals:
Change in consumer welfare= Q¯ · (PE − PB) · S
+Q¯ · (PI − PB) · N S, (5)
where PB is the price that would have been observed without liberalisation; S
the number of switchers and N S is the number of non-switchers.
14 According to the press release of DTe of 3.12.2004, the actual gap between the cheapest
and the most expensive energy provider observed at the end of 2004 was 150 euros for an
average household. This is above the amount that we would expect on the basis of Table 5.
This difference may be due to the differences in distribution of potential savings across firms
and possibly somewhat more cost-efficient operation of the cheapest new firms.
15 According to Baker et al. (1989), the price elasticity of residential demand for gas is −0.34.
16 We ignore the cost of entry. Although entry is costly, these costs are sunk, and are unim-
portant in the long run. Giulietti et al. (2005) assumes entrants’ initial cost to be 12.5 pounds
(18 euros) per year per switcher. This cost will be recovered over the next years, which means
that the prices will be a bit higher than it would be without such costs. However, allocated
over several years, the effect on price is small. We do not consider the administrative cost of
switching for the firms ether. This cost is minor.
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The first term on the right hand side of equation (5) represents the wel-
fare gains of switchers, the second term the welfare gains or losses of non-
switchers.
For PI , S and N S we will make scenario-specific assumptions as explained
below. PB , the price that would have applied in the counterfactual without
liberalisation, is of course the same in both scenario’s. In order to calculate
PB , we use the data in Table 5 (second column). These data show that 1.8%
of all customers would switch for bill savings of 25 euros per year, and 15.3%
would switch for bill savings of 50 euros per year. Linear interpolation implies
that the amount of bill savings consistent with the 9% switching level in the
data is around 40 euros per year. Hence, we assume this to be the difference
between the price immediately before and the price of entrants immediately
after liberalisation:
PB − PE =40. (6)
4.2.1 Scenario-specific Assumptions
In the optimistic scenario we assume that prices of incumbents equal prices of
new entrants, which in turn equal marginal costs:
PI = PE =C, (7)
where PE , PI and C are defined as before. In this case, equation (5) reduces
to
Q¯ · (PE − PB) · (S + N S). (8)
The number of switchers does not affect consumer welfare in this scenario.
In the pessimistic scenario the price differential between incumbents and
entrants equals the profit maximising price differential calculated in the pre-
vious subsection: 75 euros or more. We shall assume that entrants price com-
petitively, while the incumbents charge 75 euros above the entrants:
PI = PE +75=C +75. (9)
As shown in the previous section, this price differential maximises incum-
bents’ profit. At this price differential, 31% of all customers switch, while the
rest stays with their incumbent supplier.
Note that we maintain the assumption of marginal-cost pricing by entrants.
If entrants price above marginal cost, then the overall price level is higher
than in the case of marginal-cost pricing by entrants. This would lead to a
large loss of consumer welfare in the pessimistic scenario.
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TABLE 6 – WELFARE EFFECTS UNDER TWO SCENARIOS
Scenario Optimistic Pessimistic
% Consumers switched Irrelevant 31%
% Consumers paying competitive price 100% 31%
mln euros
Transfer of welfare from firms to switchers 25 87
Transfer of welfare from firms to non-switchers 255 −169
Total transfer from firms to consumers 280 −82
Source: Computations on the basis of survey data. The total number of Dutch households is
about 7 mln. The transfer amounts for switchers (non-switchers) are computed as the product of
the total number of switchers (non-switchers) and their respective price changes assumed in each
scenario, e.g. the transfer to switchers in the optimistic scenario is equal to 7 mln * 0.09 * 40.
4.2.2 Results
Table 6 shows the effects of liberalisation on consumer welfare for both sce-
narios. We distinguish between welfare effects for switchers and for non-
switchers.
In the optimistic scenario, both consumer groups benefit from price
decreases and liberalisation brings large benefits in terms of welfare reallo-
cation from firms to consumers. However, in the pessimistic scenario, where
31% switches while the rest stays with incumbents who raise prices 75 euros
above entrants, the effect on consumer surplus is negative. Notice also that, if
entrants indeed price competitively, 75 euros is on the lower boundary of pos-
sible estimates of the profitable price increase. If larger prices are profitable,
then the consumer welfare loss in this scenario is also larger. For example, the
consumer loss would be two times larger if the price gap would increase to 90
euros.
The results of these computations imply that while liberalisation is justi-
fied under the first scenario, it may result in consumer welfare loss under
the second scenario.17 Under the pessimistic scenario, in which incumbents
raise prices by 75 euros above the competitive level, consumers lose about
82 mln euros compared to the initial situation. However, if incumbents fol-
low entrants’ prices, consumers would gain about 280 mln euros.
One caveat is in order with respect to the above calculations. These calcu-
lations ignored effects from liberalisation other than price changes. In reality,
liberalisation may also intensify quality competition which would bring extra
benefits to consumers.
17 Here we focus on the effect of switching costs. Joskow and Tirole (2004) and Newbery
(2002) present other arguments that may cast doubt on the effectiveness of competition in the
small customer segment, e.g., an argument about the necessity to rely on load-profiling.
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5 POLICIES TO REDUCE SWITCHING COSTS
Policies that reduce search and switching costs may increase the probability
that the market will evolve towards the optimistic scenario. In addition to
reducing actual switching costs (e.g. switching fees), policy can aim at improv-
ing consumer perceptions of search and switching costs.18
5.1 Reducing Switching Fees
Switching fees are fees charged to customers for terminating contracts prema-
turely. Switching fees are only allowed for contracts with a fixed duration. In
The Netherlands, DTe caps the maximum of such fees.19 Switching fees are
not necessarily bad for welfare. First, they may reflect the actual administra-
tive cost incurred by the firm when a customer switches to another supplier.
Switching costs might then serve to discourage socially wasteful switching.
Second, switching costs may play a crucial role in sustaining fixed price con-
tracts. Without switching fees, such contracts would not be offered, or would
be offered at much higher prices. For these reasons, a complete prohibtion of
switching fees is not desirable.
In an emerging market where there are serious concenrns that switching
costs may inhibit competition, a case could be made for not giving too much
weight to the first argument. There is a presumption that the administrative
costs of handling switching to the firm do not need to be high. Moreover, pol-
icy makers may rather incur a risk of setting the switching fees too low and
accept some excess switching than to allow for switching fees and thus pre-
vent competition.
With respect to the second argument, this does not apply to contracts with
variable prices, where the price can be adjusted in accordance with market
developments. For such contracts, switching fees do not serve an economically
useful function.20 Switching fees are also not justified in the case of a silent
extension of these contracts, as is current practice.
18 See Pomp et al (2005) for a further discussion of policies to reduce switching costs.
19 The maximum depends on the remaining time of the contract, but not on the type of con-
tract (fixed/variable price). For 1-year contracts, the switching fee cannot exceed 50 euros. For
contracts with a longer term, the maximum compensation is 25 euros per half a year of the
remaining contract length. Additionally, a company can charge a customer up to 50 euros to
compensate for the welcome present received by the customer upon signing the contract. In
the case if a contract has been extended silently, a consumer who wants to interrupt such a
contract can face a maximal fine of 25 euros. (DTe 2005.)
20 Frequent switching is, to some extent, also prevented by law, which allows a term of
30 days for ending a contract. (Article 95m/10 of the Electricity Law.)
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5.2 Reducing Choice Complexity
Liberalisation has opened up a wide menu of options for consumers to
choose from. Currently customers have to choose between fixed prices over
1, 2 or 3 years or a variable price. Furthermore, there are ‘budget’, ‘stan-
dard’ or ‘standard-plus’ contracts and/or ‘evening-active’ and ‘standard peak-
low tariffs’ (differentiating across different consumption patterns). The effect
of such product differentiation on welfare is ambiguous. On the one hand,
differentiation accommodates heterogeneity in consumer preferences. On the
other hand, product differentiation may increase consumer switching costs,
as it becomes more difficult to compare across firms and contracts. ‘Light’
forms of standardisation of contracts may be appropriate in this case. Nor-
way represents an interesting example of such standardisation-‘light’. In 1998,
the Norwegian Competition Authority (NCA) began to publish compara-
tive tables for standardised contract types on its website in order to help
consumers to compare different contracts and suppliers. Firms could still
offer other types of contracts, but these would not be included in the
comparative tables of the NCA. For example, in 2003, Norwegian con-
sumers could easily get an overview of spot prices, fixed price contracts
lasting for 1 or 3 years, as well as the standard variable electricity price
(Norwegian Competition Authority, 2003).
5.3 Educating the Public
Many consumers do not have any experience with switching in this mar-
ket. They have to rely on information regarding other people’s experiences.
Given that the media is more likely to focus on negative experiences, com-
panies’ mistakes in handling switching create a negative externality, increas-
ing perceived switching costs. Therefore, providing consumers with correct
information, for example through advertising that all suppliers have the same
reliability and that switching costs are actually low, may improve consumer
perceptions.
6 CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis of consumer switching behaviour in Netherlands residential
energy markets stresses the importance of switching costs. Consumers who
think that searching and switching is difficult and time consuming may be
less likely to switch to another provider. Given the observed distribution of
(perceived) switching costs, it may be profitable for incumbents to raise prices
at least 75 euros per year above entrants. If such a situation persists, Dutch
households would, on balance, not gain from liberalisation. Therefore, we
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stress the need for policies that reduce switching costs and that reduce the dis-
crepancy between actual and perceived search and switching costs.
APPENDIX
Table A compares the distributions of the expected minimum bill savings of
the three largest incumbents to the distribution in the total sample. Although
firm-specific data better reflect the situation per firm, the estimates for the
total sample have smaller standard errors.
TABLE A – MINIMUM BILL SAVINGS REQUIRED FOR SWITCHING, COMPARISON
ACROSS THE LARGEST INCUMBENT FIRMS
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Total sample
Less than 25 euros 1.7 (0.8) 2.2 (0.8) 1.2 (0.6) 1.8 (0.4)
25–50 euros 9.2 (1.9) 7.4 (1.5) 11.0 (1.7) 11.1 (0.9)
50–75 euros 11.3 (2.1) 11.5 (1.8) 13.4 (1.8) 12.6 (1.0)
75–100 euros 13.9 (2.2) 16.4 (2.1) 17.2 (2.0) 15.4 (1.1)
100–150 euros 19.3 (2.6) 17.0 (2.1) 21.5 (2.2) 18.0 (1.2)
150–200 euros 5.5 (1.5) 5.0 (1.2) 3.5 (1.0) 4.6 (0.6)
200–250 euros 5.9 (1.5) 4.6 (1.2) 3.5 (1.0) 4.4 (0.6)
250–300 euros 4.2 (1.3) 2.5 (0.9) 1.2 (0.6) 2.2 (0.4)
More than 300 euros 4.6 (1.4) 3.7 (1.1) 2.6 (0.9) 3.2 (0.5)
Savings play no role in
switching decision
2.5 (1.0) 5.6 (1.3) 5.2 (1.2) 4.6 (0.6)
Will never change, indepen-
dently of the amount to be
saved
5.5 (1.5) 6.5 (1.4) 4.9 (1.2) 6.2 (0.7)
Do not know 16.4 (2.4) 17.6 (2.1) 14.8 (1.9) 15.8 (1.1)
Notes: This table gives the respective percentages and their standard errors.
The table is based on information on contracts in the electricity market.
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